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ABSTRACTAccess to water supply in Ethiopia is one of the lowest in the world. In response, Ethiopia has developed a 15-year water development projectfor the period 2002-2016 in order to enhance appropriate and comprehensive water use policies and related institutional arrangements. Theobjective of this paper is to analyze the institutional aspects of communal irrigation in Ethiopia using the concepts of institutional bricolage.Based on two case studies and intensive literature review, the trust to ensure that the poor communities achieve economic efficiency, socialequity in access to water and ecological sustainability simultaneously through the adoption of 'institutional crafting' does not seem tocorrespond with reality. It then challenges the universal application of the 'design principles' approach for its inadequacy in explaining therealities underlying the institutional formation of communal irrigation where collective action is more complex. The paper argues that theconcept of institutional bricolage is an alternative approach to understand the dynamics and complexities of institutions in irrigationdevelopment. In the face of growing demands of irrigation water, there are key issues to consider through the lens of bricolage for appropriatedevelopment interventions aimed at institutional building: acknowledging the complexity of institutional building, ecological stress, historicalfactors, power relations, gender, access to other institutions and cultural repertoires embedded in the community. Development interventionswhich recognise the importance of the processes of institutional bricolage have great potential of success and enhance sustainable use ofnatural resources.
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1. INTRODUCTIONAccess to water supply in Ethiopia is one of the lowest in theworld (World Bank, 2006). According to the World Bank , in2008, only 38% of the population have access to improvedwater (World Bank, 2010).  In 2006 the Bank conducted astudy to estimate the magnitude of the impacts of high watervariability on growth and poverty. The study finds that theeffects of water variability reduced projected rates ofeconomic growth by 38% per year and increased projectedpoverty rates by 25% over a twelve year period.  In response,Ethiopia has developed a 15-year water development projectfor the period 2002-2016 in order to enhance the appropriateand comprehensive water use policies and relatedinstitutional arrangements. Among the water sectorsagricultural water use has got the most attention through thestrategy called Agricultural Development LedIndustrialization (ADLI). The intervention of the plan is toaddress most of the supply-demand gap within 15 years timethrough increasing the number of large, medium and small
scale irrigation schemes in rural areas where 80 % of thepopulation live (World Bank, 2010). In addition, theGovernment recognizes, community managed small-scaleirrigation water schemes as viable alternative to privatizationand state ownership of the resource (Water SectorDevelopment Program of MoWR, 2003). This is expected toincrease the role of local communities in resourcemanagement.Locally, there are different institutional arrangements forirrigation water management; examples include use of "watermasters" and executives of water users' associations.Establishing appropriate water management institutions andstrengthening capacity of water management organizationsis expected to bring efficient and equitable distribution ofirrigation water for beneficiaries, thus contributing toincreased productivity (Ostrom, 1990; 1992; WSDP, 2003;World Bank, 2003; 2004). However, most of these resourcesare exploited on a first come, first-served basis which resultsin the inefficient utilization of the resources and inequalities
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in the distribution of benefits to users (Gebremedhin et al.,2002). This implies that just establishing the institutionalset-up for the resource management is not a sufficientcondition for sustainable use of the resources. Relativelycomplex legal and administrative systems are needed in waterallocation and effectiveness in internal governance is neededfor the effective application of community rules (Cleaver,2002; Cleaver and Hamada, 2010). Therefore, the need toidentify factors that facilitate or hinder the development andeffectiveness of local formal and informal institutionsbecomes important.The general objective of this paper is to analyze theinstitutional aspects of communal irrigation in Ethiopia usingthe concepts of institutional bricolage that helps to grasprelevant learning's about the nature and roles of institutionsin irrigation water management and factors determiningcollective action of irrigation management. This is importantfor two reasons. Firstly, to improve the water needs of thepoor communities and secondly, to identify recommendationsaccording to the kind of interventions in the Ethiopian context.The argument that will be developed in this paper is that, inorder to analyze institutions of communal irrigation, aninnovative analytical approach has to be used. At the core ofthis new approach is the adoption of the concepts ofInstitutional bricolage. It builds on the argument that 'institutional building should be based on socially informedanalysis of the content and effects of institutionalarrangements rather than on their form alone' (Cleaver, 2002:11).In order to achieve the stated objective the present paper willbe divided in four main sections. In the first section, I willreview literature on theories of collective action in relation tonatural resource management that will frame my study. In thesecond section, I will continue with presenting and discussingsome of the selected empirical studies conducted on small-scale irrigation in Ethiopia. In the third section, I will presentcase studies which will help me in the institutional analysisof communal irrigation using the theoretical frameworkpresented before followed by critical reflection. Finally, I willconclude by resuming the main findings and their possibleimplications.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Theorizing institutionsFrom a vast body of literature, it is possible to find that thereare three main theories of natural resource management,namely: the tragedy of the commons, community basednatural resource management and institutional bricolagewhich this paper adopts. The last two are bottom-up approach.In each of the theories, views on the role and nature ofinstitutions are different. Before discussing  the overview ofthe institutional theories, I will first give a description of thecommonly existing definitions of institutions in relation tonatural resource management, then focus on the theory ofinstitutional bricolage as the main theoretical framework onwhich my study bases.
The concepts of institutions have multiple interpretations.Scholars have often used the term in a causal manner andrefer to a great variety of things.  What is common and clearin literature is that the meaning and how they are defineddepends much on the school of  thought to which one belongs(Ostrom,  2006;  Cleaver,  2006). All these definitions perceiveinstitutions as structures likely to impact on the behaviour ofindividuals or groups of individuals. One of the mostcommonly known definitions of institutions is the 'rules of thegame' (North, 1990). Rules are a common aspect of definitionsof institutions and ' institutions' used in this paper includeboth formal and informal. In explaining the significance of theinstitutions Cleaver states ' institutions matter then because
they shape individual and collective behaviour and the pattern
of access to resources. They are the channels through which
peoples livelihoods are mediated' (Cleaver,  2006: 2).  If onesees carefully most of the definitions given, one canunderstand that much attention is given to the formal role ofinstitutions. Formal rules are not, however, the onlystabilizing influence on human behaviour.  Even if rules oftenrelate to formalized, written-down regulations, there are alsostructuring influences on behaviour. For instance, Ostrom andCleaver, recognized the equal importance and significant roleof norms and beliefs even though both are different in theperception and meaning given to the informal rules andnorms.   It is also important to note here that institutions aredifferent from organizations.  They are different in the sensethat organizations constitute groups of people with commonpurpose to achieve objectives and institutions create theframework up on which these organizations are based(Fabricius, 2004). In short, institutions are the rules, norms,and beliefs of the game where as organizations are the playersof the game. With this basic definitions,  I will turn to brieflydescribe the main scientific perspectives on institutions andinstitutional processes divided based on periods of dominancyand thinking -traditional institutional perspectives, newinstitutionalism, and post-institutionalism (Lowndes, 2002).The traditional institutional perspectives which is also calledold institutionalism was dominant in the periods of  1960 and70's ; and focused on the formal institutions and in particularon the functioning of the state, laws, and regulations(Lowndes, 2002). The basic belief was that institutions wereable to determine the behaviour of individuals simply throughtheir functioning.   One of the first respected authors tocontribute to insights into the institutional theories in thecontext of natural resource management is Garret Hardin withhis article ' The Tragedy of the Commons' which is publishedin 1968.Hardin (1968: 1244) in his famous work of the tragedy of thecommons states that ' as a rational being, each herdsmanseeks to maximize his gain. ...to add another animal to his herd....therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system thatcompels him to increase his herd without limited......freedomin a commons bring ruin to all'.  He criticized commonproperty as he regard it as a free access system in which noindividual was responsible. According to him voluntarycollective action is not possible or slim because of the selfishnature of individuals in seek of their maximization of theirindividual benefits and existence of free riding. In addition,the size of the population makes the enforcement of collective
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action difficult. The solution according to this school ofthought is twofold: privatization or state regulation.In reaction to Hardin's view, the new institutionalperspectives (CBNRM) argue that there is a need to emphasizethe social, normative or rational character of institutionsrather than focusing on the formal political aspects. Thisschool of thought do not look at the impact of institutions onindividuals but rather focus on the specific interactionbetween them (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Scott, 2001). From theview point of new institutionalism, the main critique was thatHardin defined common property as an open access system.North (1990), Ostrom  ( 1990) and others demonstrated thatcommon properties are not mere open access systems withoutany type of organization but are more likely to be structuredby formal and informal institutions. I will present here themain contributor to this school of thinking, Ostrom's commonproperty or common pool management on how the problemsof collective action is addressed in sustainable use of naturalresource. Ostrom's critique to Hardin is that, common poolresource could contribute significantly to sustainableresource management.  She argue that humans have createdtheir own institutional arrangements or able to craftinstitutions to shape behaviour in collectively desirable waysregarding natural resources over the years. She acknowledges,however, that some of these local institutional arrangementsdo lead to resource degradation.Ostrom proposed eight design principles which she called 'institutional strengthening' that can ensure the sustainablemanagement of common pool resources. This approach is oneof the most influential work of Ostrom which is widelyadopted and used by international organization such as WorldBank, UNDP, DIFID ( Ostrom, 1990; 1992; 1995; World Bank,1993;  2003). The basic assumption of institutional craftingas world bank suggest relies in the desirability and possibilityof replacing the ineffective institutions with new ones. Forexample, forming water users groups, setting up water tariffs,water permits etc. For Ostrom, institutions can be crafted andapplied universally for a specific goal, and successfulinstitutions that have been able to sustain the effectivemanagement of natural resources are characterized by theseeight main principles:1. Clarity of boundaries: this deals with the definition of theboundaries of both resources and users which can beindividuals or groups.2. Correspondence between appropriation and provision ofrules and local conditions: the rules have to be adaptedto the local situations.3. Participation: this is about collective choice arrangementsin the sense that the participation of local people linkedwith the resources in the design of the rules.4. Democracy: the existence of accountable monitoringsystems.5. Sanctions: when there is no compliance with the rules,different levels of sanctions have to exist.6. Conflict resolution mechanism: the mechanisms set forconflict resolution have to be low cost and based on localknowledge and of easy-access.
7. Minimum recognition of rights to organize: the localrights management system have to be recognized byothers level of decision making, essentially the state.8. Nested enterprises: this states that there is a necessity tohave a coherent coordination between the different layersof rights, right holders and the institutions that deal withthem.All these principles give more emphasis on institutions andstructural factors.  Even though Ostrom has contributed to agreater focus on informal institutional arrangements and theirimportant role, the primary focus has been on purposefulinstitutions with the over optimistic assumption thatinstitutions are designed for a specific goal (Ostrom, 1990;1991).  This assumption has resulted in a focus on the morevisible, formalized institutional framework of naturalresource management, such as local committees orassociations.  The over simplistic and optimistic nature of thisapproach has neglected the local embeddedness ofinstitutions in social life and has resulted in a new shift ininstitutional theories towards post-institutionalism.Post-institutionalism is a recent and emerging institutionalperspective, in reaction to the common pool resources,especially in the field of natural resource management. Thetheory states that conventional understandings of newinstitutionalism do not fill the gap between theories andcurrent realities (Cleaver, 2002; Cleaver and Franks 2005).To give concrete example here, the new institutionalismneglects, the many everyday contexts in which institutionsare located and the roots they have in local history and society.In addition, new institutionalism still tends to promote arather homogenous view of the community in which localdifferences, power, and politics are downplayed. Furthermore,this new institutionalism does not acknowledge the rathercomplex overlap of institutional domains that may result inambiguous institutions (Cleaver, 2002; Cleaver and Franks,2005; Wong, 2009; 2010). So the claim of post-institutionalism is to fill those gaps.  The next section focuseson this post intuitionalist approach in which my frameworkof analysis bases.This approach to the analysis of institutions in naturalresource management in a collective action is developed andleaded by Francis Cleaver. She called it 'intuitional bricolage'.It gives much more importance to the role of agency (Cleaver,2002, Cleaver, 2007).  This approach suggests 'howmechanisms for resources management and collective actionare borrowed and constructed from existing institutions,styles of thinking and sanctioned social relationships'(Cleaver, 2002: 16). This approach highlights the importanceof social context such as power relations, struggles, processesof negotiation in the definition and enforcement of rules andregulations. Cleaver explicitly tackles the impact of'institutional bricolage' on development interventions byarguing that they 'should be based on a socially informedanalysis of the content and effects of institutionalarrangements, rather than their form alone' (Cleaver, 2002:11). For her proper understanding of institutions requirewhat are the characteristics of people's agency, whatconstraints or enable them to behave in one way or anotherwhich includes social and economic factors, formal and
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informal institutions.  What is important for her is that, whatcan and has to be considered as appropriate institutions.  Thispaper will argue for the adoption of this new approach to theinstitutional analysis of communal irrigation by claiming thatan innovative analytical approach to the conceptualizationand analysis of institutions in communal irrigation is throughunderstanding processes of bricolage than conceptualizinginstitutions through designing or crafting. I will return toelaborate more on this concept under section 2.3.
2.2. Irrigation management and sustainable irrigation
practicesIrrigation practices can be seen as relating to both irrigationuse and irrigation management.  But, among the common poolresources in the irrigation systems, the resource base itself iscomplex, as it is linked to land, to system infrastructure, andto water itself when it comes to the issue of use andmanagement. Many institutions affect these irrigationpractices; over the years, local actors have established theirown institutional framework, and government and otherexternal organizations such as World Bank have tried toregulate these practices from the outside to make them moresustainable. This is to show that institutional analysis ofirrigation practices needs care and is so complex than othercommon pool resources. Irrigation practices are in these sensethe outcomes of dealing with all the institutional influences,both formal and informal.
Irrigation practicesThe use of communal irrigation and management can bepurposeful and rational, or they can be routinized and takenfor granted. Practices are embedded in a particular context,articulated in specific behaviour, and socially developedthrough people's interaction (Cleaver, 2002; Wong, 2008).  Inthis manner, practices are bounded; related to one thing. Theyare related to agency as well as to institutions as they areshaped by routines, traditions and regulations.  Particularlyconsiderable attention has given to the management practiceswith  policymakers often called 'good water governance' inorder for overcoming previous shortcomings in waterprovision and as a tool for meeting MDGs( UN, 2005 a; UNDP,2004; World Water Council, 2006).Even if good governance in development policy and guidelinesis often linked to a set of principles such as accountability,transparency and probity, I consider her the concept thatsignificantly linked to the establishment of institutionalarrangements for channeling the voices of water users andmediating the competing needs of different stakeholders asused  by cleaver . ' There is also too little recognition of theways in which this management systems or governancesystems are adapted at community levels to produce winnersin water allocation and access'(Cleaver and Hamada, 2010:28). Some practices related to institutions of management isoften narrowly focused on the service delivery withoutundermining the wider context that shapes the form andeffects of these interventions. Some have tried to develop ananalytical framework to help understand how arrangementsfor water management are shaped and impact on differentpeople. The framework that is developed by Cleaver (2007)
can be a good example, even if it was not specifically forirrigation governance.  The framework depends on thenumber of key concepts of which non material resources suchas institutions, social structures, and systems of rights andentitlements are of paramount important. The arrangementsin which people do to get access to water are specific to theircontext, and these ways of organizing access to water are the'mechanisms' of water governance. These mechanisms, asCleaver explains, include formal and informal institutions(such as committees, collective labour groups), tariffs andfees, arrangements for queues, rotations and technology(Cleaver, 2006; Cleaver and Hamada, 2010). Irrigationpractice are affected by pluriform institutional arrangementsthat consists of much more than just government policies orinstitutions directly linked to the irrigation itself (Meinzen-
Dick, 2000; Yohannes, 2005; Wong, 2008; Callejo and Cossı́o,2009; Cleaver and Hamada, 2010).
Sustainable irrigation practicesThe concept of sustainability remains valid with its importantrole in discussions on natural resource management. In thelast couple of decades, countries have been trying to adapt thelegislative framework to stimulate sustainability. For instance,the World Bank's Sustainable Water Framework has beenuniversally applied in many developing countries (WorldBank, 1993; 2004). However, critics argue that the concept ofsustainability issue remains unclear, fails to embrace the'diversity' and 'complexity of cultural characteristics of wateruse and distribution, narrowly defined and ambitious(Meinzen-Dick, 2000; Wong, 2008). The Bank puts threeprincipal concepts at the core of defining sustainable watermanagement framework: finance, governance, and ownership.Furthermore, privatisation, improving governance bydecentralisation, stakeholder participation, effectiveenforcement and monitoring, and appropriate technology arethe five key policy prescriptions (World Bank, 1993; 2004). If we consider ownership among the three principal conceptsput forward, it requires the definition of property rights togroup or individual and application. Rights in irrigationsystems are complex and concepts of simple' ownership' oftendo not apply than what is stated. This is because of the factthat there are different bundles of rights that should beexamined in irrigation systems and how they apply to rightsto other resources that cannot be seen separately whiledealing with irrigation. For instance, rights to land, to systemof infrastructure, the water itself and other resourcesassociated with irrigation systems. These all are indicators ofthe difficulties of the universal application of the Bank'sSustainable Water Framework for realization of sustainability.This has been already challenged and examined by manyscientists. To mention a few among many, Strang (2004)argues that the framework ignores water as a communityasset; Mehta et al.(1999) in Wong(2008) claim that theframework does not properly address political issues such asaccess to and distribution of water; and Cleaver and Hamada(2010) argue that the framework narrowly focus on gender-sensitive mechanisms of water delivery. It is also criticisedfor its inadequate understanding of human motivations,underestimating the structural  factors that constrain people'sparticipation and the complexity of institutional crafting,
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which Wong nicely coined as 'Humanising the World Bank'sSustainable Water Framework with Pro-Poor Principles ofGovernance'( Wong, 2008).The motivation for sustainable irrigation management ismostly ethical and perceived as necessary, but the conceptstill tends to be controversial as it has many meanings andconsequences. The definitions of sustainable watermanagement seem to be divided between three approachesand principles, as World Bank states. These three fundamentalprinciples are known as 'the Dublin principles' and isprofessed by the bank to govern the modern water resourcesmanagement: ecological principle; institutional principle andinstrument principle (World Bank, 2004). The Bank stronglyrelies on 'design principles' to ensure that the poor countriesachieve economic efficiency, social equity in access to waterand ecological sustainability simultaneously.The focus on formalised arrangements (institutional crafting)as tools to achieve sustainability implies that formalinstitutions are often regarded as a major dimension ofsustainability. In order to arrive at appropriate institutionaldesign, it seems more relevant to create institutionalarrangements for sustainable water use by linking localinstitutional arrangements with deeper understanding of thehistory and culture of social relations and existingcooperation. This can be done by making power more explicitin the process of institutional crafting and institutionalstrengthening, use of greater reflexivity and flexibility in theprocess of developing and implementing water governanceframeworks which all starts by acknowledging institutionalcomplexity (Wong, 2008).  In addition, I want to borrow thetwo arguments Cleaver and Hamada (2010) assert to ensure'good' water governance and gender equity which isparamount important in sustainable practice of irrigationmanagement. First, the analysis of water governance needsto understand the ways in which societal resources areallocated via economic policies, legislation etc and shapemechanisms in particular ways. This is very important whenit comes to the distribution of water by water users. Second,good water governance and gender equity which has animpact on sustainability need to consider how differentpeople are able to influence the outcomes of particulargovernance arrangements to produce gendered outcomes forhealth and well being, livelihoods and for political voice.Policies on sustainable water use should look at the widerrange of social-psychological, cultural, political dimension ofthe concept than focusing narrowly on economic rationality.In order to make sustainable water use practicable, thecomplexity of institutions must be acknowledged.  As Wong(2008: 19) states 'acknowledgement of social complexity isboth a threat and an opportunity for water intervention, butfailure to address these issues will only perpetuate theproblems in existing water programmes and reforms, and theultimate losers are the very people these programme aremeant to serve'.
2.3. Institutional bricolageAs stated earlier, in order to analyse the interface betweeninstitutions and actor's irrigation practices, this paper makes
use of a dynamic institutional approach called institutionalbricolage. Institutional bricolage is a post-institutionalapproach explaining the interaction between actors andinstitutions focusing on the dynamics of institutionalarrangements surrounding natural resource management.This approach views institutions  as both constraining andenabling human agency as institutions provide boundariesthat actors, in turn, reshape (Cleaver, 2002; Cleaver, 2006).Institutional bricolage is conceived as an active process inwhich actors (defined as bricoleurs) piece together differentinstitutional elements as some sort of crafting.  From this, itis possible to understand that institutional components arere-used, reworked, or refashioned, redesigned to perform newfunctions. This ongoing transformation is important ininstitutional bricolage. Through time institutions change inresponse to the external environment and internal views(Cleaver, 2002).The approach acknowledges the hecticinteraction between formal and informal institutions whichhas some implications for institutional influence and design(Cleaver, 2006). For instance, the actor has in principle theroom for manoeuvre to reshape the different institutionalinfluences. Bricolage is an authoritative process and some'bricoleurs' are likely to possess more authoritative resourcesthan others. These authoritative resources include economicwealth, specialist knowledge or official position, kinship andmarriage, personal characteristics such as eloquence, strengthand honesty.She argues that institutional bricolage occurs when newbureaucratic institutions are introduced to local practices thatare structured by socially embedded institutions. This paperalso uses this concept of the process of institutional bricolagein challenging the school of institutional crafting forinstitutional development. There are three types of processesof institutional bricolage as a result of the introduction of newbureaucratic institutions, namely aggregation, alteration andarticulation (see table 1). These processes hold for both thesocially embedded institutions and /or bureaucraticinstitutions and can be more or less conscious. Processes ofinstitutional bricolage are linked with various motivations, orlogics of action. These motivations are not uniform and canvary from rational, conscious decisions to less active and moreembedded explanations. Some of the decisions to reshapeinstitutions are often linked with survival strategies orconnected to necessary basic needs.  In this way, the role ofhuman agency in shaping and reshaping institutions is critical.I will base the conceptual framework of analysis and developmy argument on Cleaver's (2002) theory of institutionalbricolage and its process of articulation, alteration, andaggregation in the institutional analysis of communalirrigation in Ethiopia. The overall summary of the threeprocess and their characteristics are presented in table l below.
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3. Empirical review of literature on irrigation
management in Ethiopia
3.1. Brief history of irrigation development in EthiopiaTraditional irrigation has a very old history in Ethiopia,especially in southern parts of the country, like Konso.  Thecountry's irrigation potential is estimated in the range of 1.0to 3.5 million hectors of  irrigable land, of which between160-190 thousand ha (5-10%) is estimated to be currentlyirrigated.  In 2002 about 352 thousand ha of land is irrigatedusing small-scale irrigation schemes (Gebremdhin and Peden,2002).The first initiative to develop irrigation was taken by theimperial government in 1950's. At the beginning of 1970'sabout 100 thousand ha of land was estimated to be underirrigation and many of which were controlled  by foreigninterests, and it was mainly to increase export earningsthrough production of industrial crop. After the fall of theimperial regime, all large scale irrigation schemes werenationalized by the military government and handed over tothe ministry of the state farms. In all these times theimportance of small-scale irrigation was marginalized. Thedevastating famine that occurred in 1984/85 had forced thegovernment to adapt and implement small-scale irrigationsystem. After 1991, the current government took power and
reversed the focus on large-scale irrigation development. Nowthe focus is more on the development of small-scale irrigationschemes and improvement of farmer-managed traditionalschemes (Gebremdhin and Peden, 2002).
3.2. Irrigation experiences in EthiopiaBefore discussing some case studies conducted in Ethiopia, itis important to distinguish between the type of irrigationschemes. According to MoWR (2002) in IWMI (2005),irrigation schemes ( in Ethiopia) are classified into three onthe basis of size of land area irrigated:1. Large and medium scale irrigation – Irrigation projectsare identified as large-scale irrigation if the commandarea is greater than 3,000 hectare, medium–scale if it fallsin the range of 200 to 3,000 hectare.2. Small scale irrigation schemes - it includes traditionalsmall–scale schemes up to100 hectare and moderncommunal schemes up to 200 hectare. There might alsobe especial instances, such as the traditional spateirrigation. Small-scale modern schemes can also beconstructed by the Federal or Regional government. Suchschemes involved dams and the diversion of streams andrivers. After construction, usually they are handed overto Water Users Associations for management, operationand maintenance with the support of personnel from
Table 1: Process of institutional bricolage and their description
Source: Based on Cleaver (2002; 2006)
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Regional Bureaus (IWMI, 2005). This paper focuses on these types of irrigation schemes for its analysis.3. Micro-irrigation – This system is not understood in thesame way in the different places of the country. Someconsider micro irrigation in relation to the technologyused, for instance, drip irrigation. Currently, the use ofmicro irrigation in Ethiopia is low with regard to areacovered or volume of water used.There are different studies conducted in Ethiopia to assessthe irrigation management practices of users. For instance,Salilih (2007) employed both qualitative and quantitativeapproach, to assess the contribution of small-scale irrigationon household food security and irrigation management andproblems associated with it in the Blue Nile Basin of Amharanational regional state. His findings indicate that  thecontribution of irrigation in improving the livelihoods of thecommunity significantly vary from one irrigation scheme toanother depending on the physical structures of the scheme,amount of irrigation water, plot size, availability of inputs,management qualities. The study also indicate that of socio-cultural and technical which resulted from lack of farmersparticipation from inception to completion of projects  are themain constraints affecting the effectiveness of the schemes.Checkol and Alamirew (2007) conducted a study on technicaland institutional evaluation of Geray irrigation scheme in westGojjam zone, Amhara region, Ethiopia. The scheme has beenmanaged by Water Users Association for four years. The studyshows that the overall performance of the Water UsersAssociation in terms of managing the schemes was very poor.Even though, the study fails to conduct detail analysis on theinstitutional aspect, there are some indications which thestudy shows for the poor management of the scheme. Minimalservices rendered to the beneficiaries and absence of legalauthority among the water users association to enforce itsby-laws are some of the indicators.A similar study was conducted by Shimelis (2006) to evaluatethe institutional and management practices of small scaleirrigation systems in Ethiopia. He took the case of two smallscale irrigation systems in eastern Oromiya: Gibe Lemu andGambela Terra. Interview with key informants, Water UsersAssociation committee members and different experts andfocus group discussion were the methodology used. The resultshows that the irrigation systems were poorly managed interms of water allocation and distribution, conflictmanagement and system maintenance, because of lack ofwell-established organizational and institutional conditions.Clearly defined and well-enforced land and water rights arenon-existent at the operational level.A few studies I have chosen here to show how communalirrigation management practices of the community have beenpracticed have certain things in common.  First, most of thestudies conducted lack rigorous analysis of institutions.Second, there is less understanding on the concept ofinstitutions itself which can be seen clearly from the way theterm has been used in their studies. Third, most of the studiesfocus on the identification of constraints affecting effectiveperformance, of which institutions are part of the constraintsaffecting irrigation practices and do not extend their
investigation beyond this identification to explain theunderlying factors. Finally, even if there is divergent views onthe concept, studies repeatedly report that dysfunctionalityof /inappropriate/ institutions are the major cause for thefailure of most irrigation projects.
4. Case Studies: Atsbi and Ada'a districts
4.1. MethodologyThrough a literature review, illustrated with reference toexamples from case studies (mainly a study conducted byRahel, 2008), and experiences (I have worked in agriculturalresearch institute for four years), and communicationsthrough e-mail with concerned body, this paper  draws on theimportance of institutional bricolage in the analysis ofirrigation institutions in collective action.  The methodologywill be based on two main steps: description of the twoselected districts and detail presentation of the institutionalarrangements of irrigation schemes of both districts.
4.2. General backgroundThe two districts selected for the case studies are AtsbiWemberta district in Tigray region and Ada'a district inOromia region, Ethiopia.  Atsbi district is located about 860kmnorth of Addis Ababa. The district is geographically located13037'N latitude and 39030'E longitude. There are 16administrative localities in the district. The recent districtpopulation report estimated that there are 21,398 householdswith a total population of 110,578 in 2003/04 (AtsbiWemberta District Pilot learning site diagnosis, 2005). Ada'adistrict   is located about 47 km southeast of the capital AddisAbaba, geographically located 8030' N latitude and 39017' Elongitude. There are 27 peasant associations and 9 towndwellers associations with a total population of 138,147.There are a number of rivers and natural lakes that are beingused for irrigated agriculture (Rahel, 2008).The choice of such kind of communities is useful in analysisof institutions as there are a considerable number of WUA,WUC, focus areas of government in poverty reduction and theschemes are mainly organized and managed by farmers.Irrigation at both districts are aimed at improvingproductivity, achieving food self sufficiency and sustainabledevelopment based on a strategy called AgriculturalDevelopment-Led Industrialization (ADLI). During the studyperiod (2008), 14 and 8 irrigation projects were operating inAtsbi and Ada'a, respectively.  In the same period there were94 and 75 of water users association in Atsbi and Ada'arespectively.
4.3. Institutional ArrangementsIn the next section, I will focus on the institutionalarrangement of the water utilization mechanisms among theWUA in the two study districts, after presenting the generalframework of irrigation schemes at national level.  I will preferhere to present some of the selected important issues fromthe detailed study conducted, that will help to address theobjective of the paper. The main source of information
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presented below is extracted from Rahel (2008) unless sourceis indicated. The general organizational framework of irrigation sectionin Ethiopia is presented in the diagram below.
Figure 1: program management arrangements
Source: WSDP, 2003: p.128Water resources management policy and water sector strategydocument 'Water Sector Development Programme' of theMinistry of Water Resources (MoWR) of Ethiopia, identifies fivepartners with their roles for the country to commit itself to theachievement of the MDGs agreed on by the international
community. These are government institutions, privatesector, local communities and individuals, NGOs, andexternal support agencies, figure 1.  Their roles andfunctions of these partners are summarized in table 2.
Table 2: roles and functions of partners
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Management Systems at Community levelEach irrigation scheme is a common property owned andmanaged by the community. Each site has formed Water UsersAssociation (WUA) which is administered by Water UsersCommittee (WUC). Everybody who is the beneficiary ofirrigation water is a member of WUA in a particular scheme.WUA is a local institution (formal) and has a basic characterof authority and by-laws. It has rules, methods and sanctionsfor selecting executive committee, raising finances, settingdisputes among irrigation water beneficiaries and supervisingprovision of the irrigation water service. Each irrigation sitehas an elected committee with 3-7 members, which variesfrom scheme to scheme; with one-chair person, one-vicechairperson, one secretary, one treasurer (cashier),controller(s) and remaining as members. It also embraces awater distributor who is responsible for everyday operationof the scheme.The executive committee serves as an official link betweenWUA (users) and the government officials at Pas and Districtsand represent irrigation land owners not government. Theyare elected by water users and don't have formal office,payment or compensation for their services. There aredifferent criteria that users consider for the selection of theircommittee. Ownership of land within the same catchment'sarea, active participation within the community, age and goodfamily background  such as wealth, discipline, etc(authoritative resources). Such kind of locally set criteria havean impact on institutional set-up, which I will discuss later.
Overall, the following are some of the principal duties ofexecutive committees and water distributor:
○ Enforcing the rules and regulations set of theassociation;
○ Collect annual cash contributed from each water user;
○ Planning and mobilize resources for operation andmaintenance of the schemes;
○ Assisting government office by supplyinginformation;
○ Resolving conflict related to water distribution;
○ Negotiating with water users, they decide the waterschedule and the mechanisms how to distribute it.
Nature of Collective ActionUsers have general assembly before the start of the irrigationseason.  The objective of the meeting is to negotiate when toclean the canals, decide the schedule of water distribution,rotational irrigation intervals, for how much time to irrigateper user.etc. The main facilitators on such kind of assemblyare water distributors.  The rule and regulations of WUA inboth districts dictate that members should meet once a monthand WUC once at fortnight to discuss problems makedecisions and once a year to elect new executive committeeand water distribution.  The practice, however, is far fromwhat has been written and documented. They meet when theyneed to negotiate on the issues of maintenance, distributionof water and when there is urgent action required. Their rulesalso state that all farmers are allowed to participate equally
Source: Water Sector Development  Program (WSDP) of MoWR, 2003
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in all meetings which are led by WUC and have equal right tovote and to be elected to serve as committee, water distributoror block leader. This is also far from reality when it comes tothe participation and representation of women which will bediscussed under gender dimension.  Double representation isconsidered as inefficient and unnecessary among users.As far as contribution is concerned, the study identified threekinds of contributions among irrigation beneficiaries: in cash,kind and labour. Of the three kinds, labour is the mostcommon contribution made by members to clean andmaintain the canals collectively in a number of times a year.The amount of contribution is different among the districtsand groups. Failure to participate in the activities will resultin punishment by cash fine set by the WUA. In both districtsthe canal water charge is zero. They collect money to coveroperation and maintenance costs and payment for guards andwater distributor.  In kind contribution includes cereals whichwould be used for the payment of the guard. Othercontributions in kind from beneficiaries which they use forminor construction include stone and soil. Income collectedfrom punishment is also used for minor construction. Therewere conflicts in contributing labour between the tail andhead enders.
Water RightsEthiopia does not have any explicit legal framework forirrigation use water rights. Individual rights to irrigationwater depends on the owning of land near the scheme. Anyfarmer who has land near the irrigation water can have a rightto use the irrigation water. Thus, water use right is recognizedonly indirectly through land rights.
Legal FrameworkOne of the most important and interesting aspect of this studyis the close link and interdependence of formal and informalinstitutions. Customs and conventions have been highly usedand practiced among communities for water sharing andmanagement.  The informal customs and conventions are stillvery valuable insights for the communities in designinginstitutional mechanisms that are needed for filling theorganizational vacuum existing at grassroots level of watermanagement.  I will discuss this issue in the next section.The rules and regulations for operation and watermanagement were formulated by the users in collaborationwith the distinct agricultural offices. What is funny with thesewritten arrangements is that, it is documented only at thedistrict agricultural offices and neither water users nor WUChave the written document of the rules. They run theoperation simply as a commonly understood convention andrecall punishment rates as they want.  In Atsbi rules andregulations have been revised many times, since the beginningof the establishment of the association. Here comes thecontroversy of the universal application of design principlesphilosophy and whether local institutions are amenable todesign, the scope for negotiating the norms that underlieinstitutional arrangements (Cleaver, 2002). I will use thispoint later to argue how and why the process of bricolage ismore relevant in designing appropriate institutions for the
sustainable use of natural resource management in acollective action. Unlike in Atsbi, written rules and regulationsin Ada'a is a bit different and detailed the rights andobligations of members, committees, and other partners. Inthis district also compliance to the written arrangementsfound to be hardly possible. The level of obedience to theWUAs by-laws is low. The by-laws were never revised andraised for renegotiation.  The most frequent violation of therules reported is stealing of water, infrastructure damage bylivestock of the non members, not attending and being late inmeetings. For example, mean number of times for violation ofrules and regulations per group per year was about 13 and26 in Atsbi and Ada'a, respectively. Similarly, the meannumber of times conflict occurred one cropping season dueto water use related was 19 times in Ada'a and 10 times inAtsbi. The less occurrence of conflict and violation of rules inAtsbi might be due to the frequent negotiation and revisionof rules at different times to fit to local conditions. Such kindof situations is best explained through the concept of bricolage.
Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: mixing tradition and
modern arrangementsInteraction of formal and informal institutions (mixingtradition and modern arrangements)  in conflict resolution atlocal level were common in both districts.  This mixing oftradition and modern arrangements in conflict resolutionmechanisms took place in four different ways at four levels:
○ One to one negotiation between victims: both partiescome together and  negotiate and agree on resolvingthe conflict with the facilitating role of local elders;
○ At block or group level: this kind of negotiation is asemi-formal where the block or group leaders electedamong water users participate in the conflictresolution process.
○ Scheme level: in this case water distributor and theexecutive committee will involve in conflictresolution when the above two proposed methodshave failed.
○ Local administration and community court: this is amethod of conflict resolution where the WUC refersconflict management cases beyond their capacity tothe local administration and community court. Thecourt (formal law) is responsible for managing higherlevel conflict over water use in the community whichthe previous three fail to addresses. However, thistype of system for conflict resolution was found to beless preferable among users and executivecommittees for it’s the bureaucratic/proceduralrequirement and routine activities involved indeliberating and delivering solutions which takestime and resource.
Gender dimensionThere is consensus among scholars that the meaningfulinvolvement of women in water resources development andmanagement can help make projects more sustainable andeffective (World Bank, 2004; Delgado and Zwarteven, 2007;Wong, 2009; Cleaver and Hamada, 2010). However, the roadto get there is not a simple task as widely reported in
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literature.  In this particular intervention as well; the need forthe participation of women at three different levels: farmlevel, association (forum) level and leadership level in WUAsis explicitly stated both in government agenda and rules andregulations crafted among WUA.  All farm decision markersin a WUA have an obligation to participate at association level.However, if the economic status and family labour constraintof female headed households is realized by other members ofWUA, they will be excused for not participating inmaintenance and clearance of canals.Despite such arrangements the participation of womenremains low and large proportion of female headedhouseholds quit practicing irrigation due to 3 major reasons.The first one is related to the triple role of women-productive,reproductive and community works. The second is financialproblem - most of them are categorized in low-income levelgroup of the society, as a result, they cannot usecomplementary inputs like fertilizer, variety of seed etc. Theby-laws obligated members to use these inputs. The third isrelated to water use schedule: during water shortage season,members are only allowed to use the irrigation water only atnight which involves security threats /concerns. Institutionalarrangements do not recognise the real situation of womenand led women to lag behind triggering gender and economicinequality. Unless gender sensitivity is combined with socialanalysis, community management of water supplies is notautomatically inclusive and equality enhancing (Cleaver,2002; Jyotishi and Rout, 2005; Wong, 2008). Plots areallocated to a household as a unit, with men (husbands) beingthe representative of the household, with the assumption thatwomen would benefit through their husbands. Men'sdominant role in economic transactions, representation andlegal matters and their contribution to family income isextended to the responsibility to participate in decisionmaking bodies, such as WUAs and their meetings.  Let's turnto discuss what these case studies mean in designingappropriate institutions and how the process of bricolage istaking place.
4.4. Critical reflections about the interventionThere are two important aspects to discuss here. The fistaspect to discuss here is that the intervention made at bothsites seems to use the approach of common pool naturalresource management  that employs the Ostrom's designprinciples(1995), strongly relying on idea that appropriatemechanisms can be designed to ensure optimum resource use,beneficial collective action and hence to build social capital.The second important aspect is that the case studies confirmseveral issues highlighted in the theoretical framework. Let'sdiscuss them.The blindly application of sanctions as Ostrom 'designprinciples' suggest for effective collective action is questionedand subjected to critics. One of the main criticisms is that newformal regulations often do not link up with the socio-culturaldynamics at the local level (Long, 2001; Yohannes, 2004;Mosse, 2005). Often, the approach focus solely on designingformal institutions for irrigation practices without taking intoaccount that informal and non-irrigation institutions may justas well be important for irrigation practices. As stated in the
case studies there are cases in which the communitiesarticulate, alterate or aggregate the crafted arrangements.This is an indication of the fact that the process of bricolageis the best conceptual approach that can explain howinstitutions function and designed in a common pool resourcesuch as irrigation. The crafting of institutions need tounderstand and acknowledge the complex systems embeddedin the society. For example, credit institutions, land policy;socio-cultural contexts could determine the effective use ofirrigation. Women members were constrained by thesefactors and forced to quit the WUA. Formal institutions mayreproduce existing patterns of inequity and may serve toshape and reinforce other differences (Mair and Marti, 2009).Where the social capital is strong, the transaction cost wasfound to be low such as hiring less number of guards. Thisconfirms that fact that institutions, when designed andfunctioning properly, are able to reduce the transaction costof natural resource management (North, 1990;  Ostrom,2006).The processes of institutional bricolage described in thispaper involve the most important irrigation practices in eachcase. An important aspect in the definition of actors asbricoleurs is the possession of authoritative resources. Foreach irrigation practices, there is a different identified processof institutional bricolage. For instance, the level ofparticipation of bricoleurs depends directly on theirauthoritative resources. Authoritative resources areattributes that justify institutional position or influence(Reddy and Reddy, 2005). For instance, the criteria set to beelected as an executive committee can be a good example ofhow participation of bricoleurs in decision making process isliked with the resource (asset), status and linkages they have.Some such resources are linked to an actor's socio-politicalposition, for example, an official position, wealth, formalfunction, or a social network. The more authoritativeresources an actor possesses, the more he is able to call onthese attributes and reshape institutions. If an actor has alarge number of authoritative resources, he can become a localchange agent and will consequently have the capacity toinfluence the whole community. This makes bricolage anauthoritative process in which the people with fewerauthoritative resources are less likely to be bricoleurs and lesslikely to play an important role in processes of institutionalbricolage. This process has contributed the poorest of the poorwomen to lag behind (Bastiaensen, 2005; Mair and Marti,2009; Wong, 2008; Wong, 2010).The processes described in the case studies where norms andrules are continuously shaped by different social actors basedon social and power relationships, both inside and betweenWUA, WUC and office of agriculture confirm the existence ofinstitutional bricolage.  The norms and rules in Atsbi werecontinuously changed and shaped by different social actorswhere as the norms and rules in Ada'a were not revised. Thisis a confirmation that  institutional 'bricolage is an active andconscious process of reshaping institutions, whereas in othercases it contains more unconscious elements as someinstitutions are deeply embedded (see table 1). Thischallenged the universal effective application of the 'designprinciples' which the World Bank preaches.
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The negotiation of rules and regulations (alteration) usuallytake place between users, and with government office ofagriculture and sometimes outside of the rules and regulations.Norms and practices and relationships of trust and cooperationwhich underlie them, are often generated and negotiatedoutside the formal institutions. This shows that institutionalbricolage takes place in a wider arena than that defined by thevisible structures of bureaucratic resource managementinstitutions professed by institutional crafting/design. Theparticipation of external organizations such as NGOs may alsoundermine the process of bricolage or may be important forsustaining the institutions by providing technical to capacitybuilding to users (Edmonds, 2003). Thus, the design principlesmay not explain well the realities and are usually ill-designedwithout the deeper understanding of the socially embeddednorms, rules and beliefs. Hence, the best way to understand thiscomplex institutional set up is through the concept of bricolage.Evidence shows that bureaucratic institutions are unlikely tohave evolved through a process of institutional bricolage(articulation) and may be perceived by local people as costly,lacking in legitimacy and cumbersome. Such new institutionsare subjected to a process of evolution that over time processof bricolage will ensure their redundancy or their adaptationto create more socially embedded arrangements. This can easilybe understood with the reliance and preference of communitiesin conflict resolution on the traditional arrangements. As statedearlier the communities  prefer the informal arrangement inprocess of conflict resolution as it is less costly, lessbureaucratic and considered it more legitimate than the onebased on 'you lose, I win; you win I lose' principles. Thus, theconcept of institutional bricolage allows us to reflect the diverselocation of the generation of institutional arrangements(Cleaver, 2002)The exclusions of communities who actually own the resourcefrom using it is another threat to the sustainable developmentof institutions. This has an impact on equity and povertyreduction strategies that target the poor as well as it perpetuatepoverty and inequality.   For instance, in Atsb at one of thescheme, it has been nine years since farmers have not used theirrigation because of the conflict that has occurred between thedisplaced grazing land owners who are not compensated forthe loss of their land for dam construction and the currentirrigation water users. The intra-boundary locations of projectsalso cause a continuous conflict among communities. Such kindof conflict causes instability and use conflict as it is alsohappening in Ada'a district. The dam was constructed in-between the beneficiary district and the excluded neighbourdistrict. The presence of such conflict is also creating additionalcost for the operation of the irrigation which the beneficiariesshould share. For instance, in Atsbi and Ada'a districts four andthree guards are hired to protect the dam and its wholestructure from any external attack such as attack from thedisplaced people, respectively. Building of appropriateinstitutions to ensure optimum resource use need properconsultation of the communities whom the project affect andwell informed  analysis of the content and effects of intuitionalarrangements(William, 2001; Yohannes, 2005; Reddy, 2005).To further elaborate the importance of institutional bricolageas analytical elements to understand the institutional dynamics
and complexities of irrigation development, I want to bringhere the three streams of criticism developed by Cleaver andFrank (2005) as regards to the conventional 'deignprinciples' promoted by the common property resourcemanagement approach. The first one is the narrow
functionalism of institutions: the trend to consider peopleas a function of the institution and resource to be managed,in this case irrigators, and the outcomes produced in termsof more effective resource management leading to partialunderstanding of their motivations for collective action, andalso simplistic assumptions about the relationships betweenrules and decision making structures within institutions.The second one is the simplistic evolutionism of
institutions. Institutional theory assumes an almost linearpath which institutions should follow (Ostrom, 2000).However, the case studies presented earlier confirm thatthere is no linear path and it is difficult to predict exactlyhow newly introduced arrangements will become revised,adapted and socially embedded over time, or abandonedand forgotten, through process of institutional bricolage.The final one is related to the understanding of social
complexity.  The case studies re-affirm that there is noconsistent existence of clear boundaries within communitiesand resources.  Natural resources are beyond commoditiesand are invested with social and symbolic meaning to people(Cleaver, 2000) whose decisions about them can differ fromexternal perceptions of efficiency and optimization.Gender sensitivity need to be combined with social analysis,community management of water supplies is notautomatically inclusive and equality enhancing. There wasrecognition that women should play an increased role inwater management, and a requirement that water pointcommittees should primarily consist of women (WorldBank, 2003; IWMI, 2005; Wong, 2008). However, poorwomen were less likely to be elected to positions on WUCor group leader.  When asked the criteria used to electpeople to positions of responsibility users repeatedlymentioned two qualifications: someone they could respectand someone with authoritative resources such as cash,linkage, wealth, etc. However, the stereotype developed inthe communities do not favour them and poor womengenerally have less access to water supplies and greaterconstraints on time and labour resources than other womenor men. For those who were able to overcome these factorsand able to secure positions, their performance andefficiency was higher than the men counterparts. Actorshave embedded understandings of a certain way of doingthings that are linked not only with ethical norms, such asthe appropriate way, but also with beliefs or traditions.These norms and beliefs influence irrigation practices to thesame extent as rational survival strategies or actions basedon expedience (Cleaver 2000, 2002).In sum, the following interrelated factors affect theinstitutional sustainability of communal irrigation: missunderstanding of the complexity of institutionalarrangements, scarcity of resources (water); ecologicalstress; geographic location of the resource withincommunities-exclusion of others, tension between tail andhead end users; socio-cultural contexts; power relations;
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gender; access to other institutions such as inputs markets,output markets, types of land and land rights.
5. Conclusions and Policy ImplicationsThe government still have great confidence in the functioningof transparent formal institutional arrangements as a means toprotect and ensure sustainable utilization of irrigation. Thistrust, however, does not seem to correspond with reality aspeople's choices about whether or not to comply with laws arebased on many factors that never seem to be related in a visibleand simple linear fashion ( Poteete and Ostrom 2002).Different levels to analyze institutions are discussed,particularly from institutional bricolage perspective byidentifying key knowledge gaps and the need to integrate someof the elements found in the different approaches. Common poolresources management highlights the role of local organizationsand institutions with respect to collective water management,and the possibilities to design "robust institutions" consideringthe involvement of different stakeholders, not only (state)authorities. A post-institutional approach focuses on thedynamics of social behaviour and the way in which institutionsare constantly shaped and re-adapted by collective action(Cleaver and Franks, 2005). The post-institutional approachlooks at institutions neither as static nor as "robust" structureswithin which human behaviour is supposed to be defined. Itconceive institutions as a "bricolage" of different rules, socialand power relations shaped by continuous collective actionresulting in a diversity of arrangements at different levels.Therefore, key issues for appropriate developmentinterventions aimed at institution building should consider:historical factors, power relations, gender, and world views(cultural repertoires). Under such condition, I have argued thatthe concept of institutional bricolage is an analytical approachto understand the dynamics and complexities of irrigationdevelopment.As Cleaver and Franks (2005) argue literature tends to'emphasize the formalization of institutional arrangements, thecodification of rules and regulations, the specification of clearauthority structures, and the strict exercise of sanctions against'free riders'. I have presented thoroughly the limitations ofthese universal application of the 'design principles' approachfailing to explain the realities underlying the institutionalformation of communal irrigation where collective action ismore are complex.  In this context 'institutional bricolage' areimportant elements when water institutions need to beanalyzed regardless of the institutional setting of any onecountry. Two things are important in the use of the concept ofinstitutional bricolage: flexibility and uncertainty. Powerrelations, class and gender issues, or inter-sector relationshipsinfluence the application of norms, making them negotiablegiven the specific context existing at that moment.There are common elements that have been raised amongdifferent schools of thought.  A common element is the way inwhich institutions are conceived, not only as a state or formalstructure, but mainly as rules that govern people's interactions.It is necessary to emphasize that institutional analysis underdifferent approaches coincides with the general elements used:institutional structure and administration, local arrangements
and practices, norms and legal framework, and policies. Thedifferences among the approaches are the specific elementsthat are used to analyze institutional dynamics and theirpractical implications: some consider the structure and theneed to formalize rules under state law and administrationas being more important and others recognize the role ofcollective action as the driving force that shapes institutionalfunctioning.Thus, in the face of growing demands of irrigation waterwith declining water resources, the concept of institutionalbricolage is the better analytical approach to understand thedynamics and complexities of irrigation development indiverse socio-ecological settings such as communalirrigation hence build appropriate institutions that can fitthe needs of the poor. This can only be addressed throughthe process of institutional bricolage. The case studiesconfirm the need for this diagnostic approach. I want toconclude with what cleaver (2002: 29) asserts inunderstanding of the dynamics of institutional bricolage, 'wecannot predict exactly how newly introduced arrangementswill become revised, adapted and socially embedded overtime, or abandoned and forgotten, through process ofinstitutional bricolage'. Thus, development interventionswhich recognise the importance of the processes of(institutional) bricolage have great potential of success andensure sustainable use of natural resource.
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